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ABSTRACT
This thesis will investigate the impacts of residential
growth controls on the homebuilding industry in southern
Orange County, California.
As a result of rapid population growth, communities
across the country and in California in particular, have
implemented growth control plans in an effort to
maintain the quality of life of the community as well as
to minimize the impacts of rapid growth on both existing
and future services and facilities. Growth controls
have contributed to a more regulatory environment with a
longer approvals process that exacts large impact and
permit fees. These fees, in combination with the high
cost of land, result in the highest median price for a
single family home in the nation.
This thesis examines the types of homebuilders that can
survive in this environment and the business strategies
they use. Examples of the costs a homebuilder incurs
when undertaking a project in a community that has
implemented growth controls have been provided in
addition to a discussion of the impacy that these costs
have on the economic and social community at large.
Thesis Supervisor: Michael Wheeler
Title: Lecturer in Urban Studies and Planning
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CHAPTER 1
A BRIEF HISTORY OF GROWTH MANAGEMENT
Growth management plans have been implemented in cities
across the country as a means of controlling rapid
growth and its associated negative impacts. These
impacts are most often cited as: increased traffic
congestion and commuting time; deterioration of air
quality; the reduction of available services including
water and sewer treatment, police and fire service, and
schools; and the loss of open space through the
development of land that is environmentally sensitive
and not necessarily the best for development. Many of
the communities which have implemented growth controls
are primarily interested in maintaining the character
and quality of life which contributed to its
attractiveness while others wish to minimize the fiscal
impacts of uncontrolled growth. The former have been
variously described in the literature as elitist and the
latter fiscally conservative.
Growth controls can be categorized into two broad areas:
1) Controls which allow for development at a reasonable,
planned rate. These controls, sometimes referred to as
"growth management," attempt to ensure that
infrastructure is not overtaxed, neighboring land uses
are compatible, etc. 2) Controls which attempt to slow
or stop development as an end unto itself. These are
sometimes justified as "preserving rural character,"
although the communities seldom qualify as "rural." This
kind of growth control attempts to avoid the problems of
growth in general and the influence of "land hungry"
central cities by halting growth. Other- mitigating
measures are seldom invoked (California State Department
of Housing and Community Development).
Burrows (1978) and Dowall (1981) further categorize
growth controls as follows:
- limitations on the level of intensity of development
permitted (subdivision control, zoning);
- stringent design and performance standards for lots and
buildings (subdivision control, zoning);
- shifting costs from the public to the development
project (adequate public facilities ordinances,
exactions and impact fees, administrative fees for
application review and processing);
- reductions in the supply of developable land and/or
restrictions on the locations where development is
permitted (zoning, urban limit lines, greenbelts,
agricultural reserves);
- reductions in the amount of growth permitted, overall or
per unit time (population caps, square footage or
housing unit caps, annual permit caps).
Growth management plans have been controversial since
they were first implemented in the 1970s in communities
such as Petaluma, California, Boulder, Colorado and
Ramapo, New York. Each of these cities sought to limit
new housing to preserve their existing small town
character and each withstood legal challenges from
groups or individuals who felt their rights to develop
would be unjustly limited. The plans have been accused
of increasing the costs of housing, shifting the
employment base out of the community and inhibiting the
ability of low and moderate income people from residing
in these communities. While supporters might hope that
the plans improve or at least maintain their quality of
life, in effect, these limitations often contribute to
the further degradation of the environment by
contributing to the sprawl of the metropolitan region in
which the community is located. Growth limitations and
restrictive land use controls implemented under the
guise of protecting the surrounding environment are
"hustles" (Frieden 1979) which elite communities use to
exclude undesireable economic or social groups of people
from the community while benefitting themselves by
increasing the property values (Ellickson 1977).
THE IMPACTS OF GROWTH MANAGEMENT ON THE COST OF HOUSING
The most serious accusation directed towards growth
management plans and the one that has been most studied
is their impact on housing costs. Studies have
consistently shown that California cities experience
increased housing prices after implementation of a
growth management plan in both direct and indirect ways.
Dowall (1984) reported in his study of six California
communities which implemented growth management plans
that there are a number of ways which a community's
local land use policies can affect the cost of housing:
restrictions on the amount of land available for
development; restricting the intensity of development of
land (through zoning); increasing the fee requirements
and approval times for subdivision plans; requiring the
construction of both on-and off-site infrastructure
improvements; and charging large permit and impact fees.
All of these actions contribute to a need for greater
capitalization on the part of the homebuilder who now
must pay additional interest charges, taxes, and
overhead costs as well as inflationary increases.
The indirect consequences of growth controls on housing
costs as described by Dowall include restrictions on the
developers ability to respond to demand when demand
exceeds current supply. The supply of housing is
restricted often as a result of insufficient amounts of
residentially zoned land in the community. When this
occurs, prices go up and in the long term, will increase
demand for housing in neighboring communities (Dowall
1984). This "bottleneck" has occured in a number of
Northern California communities where the many new
electronics companies interested in locating in the
Silicon Valley are forced to look elsewhere due to a
lack of residentially zoned land to provide housing for
employees. In Southern California, housing prices in
Orange County are forcing employees of Orange County
firms to purchase more affordable housing in neighboring
Riverside County and to some degree, in northern San
Diego County. This is the result of insufficient
amounts of residential land and an increase in the cost
of land in Orange County, both of which have contributed
to increased sale prices.
Another contributing factor to increased housing prices
is an overly burdensome approvals process which makes it
difficult for new development firms to enter the market.
This leaves the homebuilders who purchased the land for
a price low enough to offset additional costs
attributable to the approvals process, as the strong
players in the market, for "they can afford the risks of
operating in an environment of uncertainty"(Dowall).
This makes it easier for these developers to control
local land markets and the result is often "leapfrog
development" where less fortunate developers "must move
out to less centrally located and less expensive land.
If local land use ordinances prohibit leapfrogging, the
developers who control land can act as monopolists"
(Dowall).
In addition to these restrictions, Dowall found that
negotiated development with city staff and community
groups can lead to higher housing costs when these
groups demand lower density and more luxurious
subdivision improvements. In response to these demands,
the developer who initially proposed a large
moderate-priced development is now faced with higher
subdivision and per-unit land costs. In order to
make-up for these costs, the developer often responds by
reorienting the project to a higher-income market by
adding amenities and features to the homes which become
unaffordable to a more moderate income group. This
reorientation is a common tact taken by homebuilders in
markets controlled by growth management plans which will
be discussed throughout this thesis.
This trend towards controlling the rate and pattern of
development was contrary to the post World War II years
of development which saw governments at all levels
encouraging and often assisting land developers and
merchant builders in their efforts to subdivide suburban
property (Eichler 1982). This was most true in
California which was one of the first states to
establish government entities responsible for the
creation and enforcement of development approval
procedures such as plan review, public hearings, etc.
GROWTH CONTROL IN CALIFORNIA
In the 1960s, in response to rapid population growth,
California experienced a movement towards limiting the
amount and type of growth that could occur in its
communities with the stated primary purpose of
protection of the environment. This movement began by
controlling coastal development, the development of
agricultural lands and ensuring quality water for the
state. It evolved into programs which concerned
themselves with the effects of development upon all the
services of a community (Eichler 1982).
By the mid-1970s, many California cities and counties
had growth management policies and procedures in some
form most often in the form of zoning restrictions.
These procedures added more complex and timely reviews
to the approval process by including an assessment of
development proposals on their impact on public
services, local government reviewed design, internal
recreational facilities, unit size, planting, and other
conceptual aspects of the building program. The result
was a reduction in the total number of units permitted
and added time and increased standards which
dramatically increased development costs (Eichler).
From 1986 through 1989, 122 growth control measures were
on the ballot in various cities throughout California.
These initiatives had a 62% passage rate (California
Association of Realtors, December 1989).
SELECTED GROWTH CONTROL PLANS
This thesis will investigate plans which are more
correctly known as slow growth or residential
development control systems that have been adopted as
tools to implement the goals set forth in the General
Plan of each city. Each community is primarily
interested in the preservation of the existing quality
of life or ambiance of the community by minimizing the
impacts of new development on existing residential
developments, surrounding environmental amenities,
public services and the overall economic vitality of the
community. The plans are normally implemented in
response to a period of development which is threatening
those qualities mentioned above and are often designed
to limit the population
number of residential
year with the ultimate
growth over a number of
of the community by limiting the
building permits available each
goal of controlling the rate of
years.
For example, the City of San
implemented an ordinance to manage
"a period of intense residential
adversely affecting the capacity
Clemente, California
growth in response to
development which is
of the streets and
local freeway system to meet traffic demands,
capacity of parking facilities in business, beach and
other areas, the capacity of area schools to absorb
children, the village by the sea character of the
community, the quality of life prevalent in the city,
its sphere of influence and the surrounding region, and
the cost to households of some utilities and municipal
services"(Ordinance No. 922, City of San Clemente,
1986). This ordinance was implemented in response to a
citizen's initiative submitted at the special municipal
election held in the City of San Clemente on February
25, 1986 and limits the number of dwelling
can be constructed in the city to a maximum
year.
units that
of 500 per
The City of San Juan Capistrano, California implemented
a Residential Growth Management Plan in 1976. This plan
was specifically designed to control the unprecedented
growth the city had experienced between 1970 and 1976: a
the
population growth of 3,781 to approximately 15,500. An
average annual increase of 600 dwelling units occured
between 1970 and 1975, with a high of 1,122 units in
1972 (San Juan Capistrano City Code). The plan set an
annual growth rate of 400 units annually.
The growth experienced in San Juan Capistrano and San
Clemente was not the result of any expansion of the
local economy, but was due to an influx of people
commuting to jobs in the employment centers of Orange
County and retirees who were moving into a number of
mobile home parks in the community. As a result, many
long-time residents of the town consider it to now be
"just a bedroom community" as opposed to the rural
community to which they were accustomed (Dubbink 1984).
This thesis will investigate the impacts of Residential
Growth Control Plans on the homebuilding industry in
southern orange County, California. It is believed that
the implementation of these plans caused a certain
number of homebuilders to cease doing business in these
communities due to an inability to meet the up-front
capital expenditure requirements that such plans
dictate. If these homebuilders are not "forced" out of
the market, the thesis will attempt to determine how
they reorient their business to survive in the newly
regulated environment. In addition, the thesis will
provide a hypothetical example of the additional costs
which a homebuilder incurs when undertaking a project in
a community that has implemented growth control and will
discuss what impact these costs have on the economic and
social community at large. In particular, the thesis
will discuss the impact on the developers desire and
ability to build in such markets.
What impact do growth control plans have on the economic
viability of the residential developer in these
communities? Who are these homebuilders? This thesis
will investigate the impacts of growth management plans
which control the number of residential permits
available on an annual basis, on the local homebuilding
community.
THE NATURE OF THE HOMEBUILDING INDUSTRY
---------------------------------
Before an analysis of the growth controls can be
undertaken, it is necessary to review the history of the
homebuilding industry in America in an effort to
understand how this industry operates in Southern
California. In 1982, Ned Eichler completed a study of
"Merchant Builders" in an effort to identify the history
and development of this unique American industry
(Eichler, 1982). This study highlights the national
trends and moods which created a market for the single
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family home.
The earliest examples of large-scale homebuilders in
this country were according to Eichler's history, those
early entrepreneurs who attempted to address the demand
for hundreds of thousands of new homes for those
families who emerged after World War II. Housing starts
jumped from a level of 300,000 a year in the 1930's to 1
million in 1946 and 2 million by 1950. Responding to
this demand, builders acquired the land in areas that
would accommodate the development of mass produced,
low-priced or low-rent housing. The location of land
was critical for the success of the projects, as
employment centers remained in the central cities at
least initially. Inexpensive agricultural land at the
edge of the city was thus subdivided for the development
of housing. The physical characteristics of this
agricultural land made development of these projects
more feasible for the land was typically flat, dry, and
less expensive than land in the city. In short,
suburban development was a response to a desire to own
one's own home in an area away from the dirt and noise,
corruption, danger, and contamination of the city
(Eichler). This movement was accelerated by the
construction of highways and rail lines which made
travel between these outlying areas and the central city
more convenient.
In 1954, the Eisenhower administration drafted
legislation to fund the interstate highway system which
was proposed to have approximately 34,000 miles of
freeways across the country. These freeways were
originally intended to bypass the urban centers of the
country, presumably to facilitate interstate commerce
and the desires of those involved in the development of
new suburban communities. Though the original plans
were eventually altered in order provide urban
interstate routes, the initial construction of the
interstate highway system was probably the single most
important factor in the development of America's
suburban communities (Freiden and Sagalyn, 1989). New
highways in combination with inexpensive and abundant
gas, inexpensive automobiles and the rising incomes of
postwar families in search of single family detached
housing, contributed to the increased use of the
automobile at the expense of urban transit systems and
urban life in general.
Land was the most important ingredient for the success
of the new suburban housing developments. The cost of
this land was generally prohibitive to the new builder
for few banks were legally prohibited in the 1940s to
make loans on undeveloped land to builders without a
proven track record (Eichler). Builders therefore
arranged financing with the seller of the land (usually
the farmer). These sales were made with purchase and
sale agreements through which the seller (or a title
company acting as the escrow agent) accepted a small
deposit from the buyer to secure the transaction; this
deposit was eventually applied to the purchase price.
Land deals were made through the use of creative
financing which would limit the amount of up-front
capital required by the developer but which would also
provide the seller with tax benefits, land deals were
made. These deals, which were quite risky for the
seller, provided the developer with the inexpensive land
needed to undertake large housing subdivisions and were
often the result of a strong, direct sales pitch from
the builder (Eichler).
The important factor for the success of the merchant
builder was the ability to select a site which was
marketable and that could be obtained with the most
favorable financial terms. This usually meant that the
developer put up as little money as possible. It was,
however, also necessary to select a site which had a
minimum of engineering problems and was not subject to
excessive government regulations both of which were
costly and time consuming. The successful developers in
the homebuilding industry were those who learned the
political realties that were evolving around them and
who could guide their projects through the process.
Homebuilders represented the business fabric of America
which respected the entrepreneurial spirit. This spirit
was rewarded for many years as these companies expanded
to newer and larger markets across the country.
Eventually these builders would find the development
environment more treacherous and less cooperative.
In the 1970s, several economic factors contributed to a
more complex development environment for homebuilders:
an increase in operating expenses, an oversupply of
units, and a national recession. Up to this point,
housing had been constructed at unprecedented levels.
Once the combined realities of the factors mentioned
above became evident, it was historically obvious that
housing production had to decline. More specifically,
Eichler points out the following signs of difficulty
within the housing industry in the 1970's which led to a
recession within the industry: withdrawl from housing by
some acquirers (investors); apartment-operating costs
increasing faster than rents; rising apartment
vacancies; construction bottlenecks and costs increasing
faster than the consumer price index; and declining
contract sales in 1973 (Eichler).
These problems led to the demise or restructuring of
many homebuilding firms who were ill-prepared to respond
to these changes in the marketplace. Some of the
premier homebuilders in the country such as Levitt,
Larwin, Presley, McKeon, and Kaufman and Broad, suffered
the most and were forced to either restructure or go out
of business (Eichler). In the late 1970s, the amount of
net savings and available mortgage funds swelled and
interest rates declined. This combination contributed
to a renewed boom in housing production which was
somewhat tempered by an increase in residential debt.
Various monetary policies of the government and actions
taken by the financial institutions with regard to
inexpensive interest rates contributed to record home
sales. At the same time, however, restrictions on land
development were becoming more commonplace, resulting in
an increase in the value of land already approved. This
contributed to an increase in the cost of housing that
was offset by the increasing number of buyers willing to
pay ever increasing prices. As house prices rose faster
than the rate of inflation and total production
increased, merchant builders were able to produce not
only more units but to achieve higher gross margins
(Eichler).
This strong new market supported some of the same large
companies that had been in the homebuilding industry for
years, while it saw the demise of others. In
particular, many of the new entries to the industry in
the 1970s experienced great success as they concentrated
their land acquisition and development efforts on
markets which they felt they understood and could to
some degree control. New regulatory requirements in the
form of growth controls would however have varying
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impacts on their success and business operations.
As previously discussed, most communities throughout the
county which have enacted growth control plans have
experienced an increase in the price of both land and
housing. This is no less true in California, where
housing prices have risen faster over the last fifteen
years than in any other region of the country. This
timeframe was characterized by intense shelter demand
and frenetically speculative inflation in the California
housing markets (Downs, 1989). During the period from
the third quarter 1987 to the third quarter 1988, Orange
County, California posted the fastest rate of increase
in median home price in any metropolitan area at 32%.
Partly because of this factor, Orange County has the
highest home prices in the country. The county's
strategic location in southern California between Los
Angeles and San Diego counties is very attractive to
people and firms who are attracted by its climate,
beaches and strong, diversified economy. These factors
make the county more desireable than such inland
locations as Riverside and San Bernadino counties where
overflow demand from Orange County is also driving up
the cost of housing.
Over three hundred thousand people moved into Orange
County between 1980 and 1988 resulting in 131,000 new
households. Only 123,000 building permits were issued
over roughly the same period however, reflecting a ratio
of permits to new households of less than one housing
unit permit per household (Downs). From the perspective
of supply-side economic theory, areas that erect
barriers to building new homes in the form of growth
controls, would have lower such ratios than areas in
which new building is encouraged. While the majority of
communities in Orange County do not have formal growth
control plans, less than one additional housing-unit
permit per new household was granted between 1980 and
1987. This indicates a low supply-side response to
increased population in the county. At the same time,
the county experienced the highest home prices in the
country (Downs, 1989). This reflects the large demand
for housing in that area and provides an insight into
the basis for the success of the homebuilding industry
in the county.
CHAPTER 2
STRATEGIES UNDERTAKEN BY THE
HOMEBUILDING INDUSTRY IN COMMUNITIES
WITH GROWTH CONTROLS
The Orange County homebuilding industry has been
dominated over the last two decades by a handful of very
large landowners who either acquired or have been in
ownership of parcels of land in excess of 10,000 acres.
In fact, the Irvine Company continues to own in excess
of 50,000 acres. Over the years, these companies have
either developed the land themselves or have sold
parcels of land to other merchant builders for
development. It is estimated that these builders have
over $10 Million in annual sales.
In addition to these large landholders, there are other
owners of smaller tracts of land that was once used for
agricultural purposes who are interested in either
developing the land themselves or in selling the
property to established developers. In both cases, the
property owner wishes to take advantage of the
significant economic appreciation of property no longer
viable as agricultural land in this rapidly urbanizing
area. For those involved in the development of
residential projects, as in any other real estate
investment, they must consider the potential risks
versus the returns on their investments. This thesis
will investigate the home building industry to determine
the types of the builders who can operate in communities
that have implemented growth control plans, how these
builders respond to such plans and the impact of their
responses on the development of housing in Orange
County, California.
LONG-TERM LANDOWNERS AND DEVELOPERS
A majority of the large homebuilders in Orange County
are land owners who bank land with the intention of
developing it. These companies are generally
diversified in product type and build in a number of
communities in the county. The ability to develop the
land is dependent on their ability both to successfully
market a product in demand at that particular time and
to understand and successfully navigate through the
development approvals process including subdivision and
zoning approvals, building permit allocations and
building permit review. These processes each have
associated costs associated which must be added to
charges for infrastructure improvements and the fees
attached to the development of property which are not
related to the physical development of a particular
piece of property. The latter might include school
fees, or area-wide transportation and utility charges.
These fees compound the cost of carrying the land over
both the approvals period and construction period and
are a significant cost of doing business. For example,
a developer of one project in the City of San Juan
Capistrano is estimated to have land carrying costs of
$60,000 per week for this project alone.
The National Association of Homebuilders has determined
that a homebuilder can expect financing expenses to
range from three to five percent of operating expenses.
At the same time, finished lot costs account for 23
percent of the costs of sales for homebuilders in the
Pacific region,according to a NAHB 1988 Cost of Doing
Business Survey. Finished lot costs are defined as the
accumulated costs of finished lots that have been
developed or purchased. Included are the cost of raw
land, financing and interest, land planning, zoning, and
other costs pertaining to the development of the land.
Costs of sales are made-up of direct construction costs,
indirect construction costs and finished lot costs which
represent all costs associated with the units sold by
the firm (NAHB, 1989).
Though it is difficult to know how much these figures
may vary from state to state, it can be assumed that the
cost of financing a project in today's more restrictive
climate is a substantial part of doing business in
California. To what degree or by what amount this
affects the business will depend on how the project is
financed. The recent restrictions placed on the savings
and loan industry by the federal government make it
impossible for an S&L to loan more than 10 percent of
its total assets to real estate developers. This
severely limits the amount of money available to
developers and requires them to be more prudent about
the projects that they develop.
SALE OF PROPERTY TO MERCHANT BUILDERS
If it is determined that it is not feasible for the
company to develop a particular parcel of land
themselves, this property may be sold to a smaller,
merchant builder. For various business reasons, large
homebuilders/landowners determine that there is profit
to be made in selling the land to other developers
without constructing the homes themselves. In this
capacity, the landowner becomes a land developer who
markets a parcel for which infrastructure has been
provided and development approvals have been granted,
making the property more valuable. The landowner may
sell the land at a price that assumes an established
return on investment for the purchaser and requires a
participation in the profit that the purchaser
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experiences from each home. For example, a landowner
sells property to a builder for $1,000,000. The
landowner requires that each home in the project be sold
for a minimum of $300,000. If the unit sells for more
than this minimum amount, the landowner receives 50% of
that amount which exceeds the minimum. In order for the
builder to experience additional profit, a higher price
must be charged for each unit which in turn largely
depends on the market.
In some instances, this sale is contingent on the
purchaser constructing the project under the rigorous
design and construction standards set forth by the
seller. This quality control is a necessary ingredient
for the landowner because these standards are what has
to a large degree, made the property valuable to begin
with. The maintenance of strict design controls
guarantees the profit to both parties. This motivates
the smaller builder to enter into such an arrangement.
It should be noted that the builder who purchases the
land in such transactions is not always small (that is,
a homebuilder who builds 100 units or less a year). In
fact, some of these merchant builders are companies that
have been in business as homebuilders for many years but
who have been forced to discover and take advantage of a
smaller niche in the marketplace.
In addition to the builders who purchase the land to
develop it, there are those who acquired the property
through bankruptcy or foreclosure proceedings at a
reduced price. These purchasers are usually not
homebuilders but investors who may hold the property
long enough to receive preliminary development
approvals, which makes the property more valuable, or
they may gain the approvals and hold the land and
contract a builder to construct homes on it for sale.
REPOSITIONING
Another business option which must be exercised by both
the large homebuilder/landowner and the smaller merchant
builder is the repositioning of their product within the
market in an effort to remain competitive. This
repositioning is necessary in a market where perhaps too
much of a certain product has been brought on line and
is presently not preferred by the buying public.
Several homebuilders interviewed for this thesis
indicated that it takes from four to five years from the
time the land is purchased to complete the application
process for building permit allocation and construct a
home on a parcel of ground in Orange County. Before the
application for building permit allocations can begin,
the homebuilder must have preliminary subdivision
approval which provides a general outline of the
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proposed development. This preliminary approval will
typically only be granted as a result of positive
discussions with city planners responsible for the
approval of development plans and others interested in
the development process such as neighborhood groups.
These discussions are designed to ensure that the
proposed development will be physically and
aesthetically compatible with the existing character of
the area. The criteria established within the growth
control ordinances are designed to ensure that the
proposal will not overburden the existing infrastructure
unless system improvements will be funded by the
developer.
In order to begin discussions with the city, the
homebuilder must have a proposed product type which is
considered to be compatible with the surrounding area,
consistent with the pattern of development of the city
as outlined in the city's General Plan, and last but not
least, marketable. The amount of time dedicated to the
project to this point is considerable, making any
changes very expensive and frustrating. The success of
the homebuilder is not only dependent on his or her
ability to efficiently process the development, but to
be able to anticipate the demands of the market four or
more years in advance. This process contributes
significant risk to the development process.
NEW COMPANIES TO THE MARKET
All new entrants to the local market will experience the
same development costs as the existing developers with
the notable exception that they can expect higher land
costs as a result of the appreciation of land values
over the years. This is particularly true in
communities which have enacted growth control plans
which have limited the number of permits available or
plans which have limited the amount of land available
for development. They will also encounter those
additional costs associated with development such as
increased costs of materials and labor that other
builders will experience. Small builders will actually
incur higher costs because of the economies of scale
which will not allow them to purchase materials at bulk
discount.
Higher land costs, materials, and labor will result in a
tendency of builders to upgrade the size and quality of
units that they build in markets of "excess demand".
When current demand exceeds current supply, home
builders tend to contruct more expensive units because
they can get more profit per lot and higher profit
margins (Downs). In communities with growth controls
this tendency to upgrade is an even more common
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occurence because larger units on larger lots are often
exempt from the growth control plan. The construction
of additional expensive homes contributes to a further
reduction in the relative affordability of the community
to those of more moderate means. The number of and
demand for units of any particular type or price range
for sale at any given time will also play a role in the
decision to continue constructing large, expensive
homes.
GROWTH CONTROL SPECIALISTS
In addition to identifying the types of developers who
have experienced success in a variety of markets, the
thesis will attempt to determine if there are those who
choose to build in communities with growth controls
because they have found a competitive advantage to doing
business in those communities. These companies may in
fact be the same large firms discussed throughout this
thesis as the success of a firm in a community having
growth controls is particularly dependent on its ability
to obtain financing. As financing becomes more
difficult to obtain from savings and loans who have
historically been the principal source for working
capital for home builders, the large firms may be the
only companies left in the market.
CUSTOM BUILDERS
Custom builders represent a growing segment of the home
building industry in communities that have implemented
growth controls for as previously mentioned, they
likewise build large, expensive units exempt from the
ordinance and desireable to a greater segment of the
homebuying population in Orange County. This demand is
unique in light of a $40,000 1989 median income for the
county (Downs).
Custom builders are described by the National
Association of Homebuilders as those builders
constructing one-of-a-kind units, generally on scattered
lots and with a degree of craftsmanship indicating
higher per-square-foot sales prices (NAHB). While there
is no way to determine exactly how many custom builders
there are in the county, it is noteworthy that the
single most active price category in the first quarter
of 1990 was the "over $450,000", which accounted for
over 19 percent of all detached product sales with 108
units sold. This statistic while somewhat deceiving in
a county having a median sales price for homes
approaching $335,000, nonetheless represents a niche in
the marketplace which can support custom homebuilders.
Orange County, like many other expensive areas in the
country consists of many households with two well-paid,
full-time wage earners with average incomes exceeding
the median who can qualify for the mortgages for these
expensive homes.
The continued success of the builders of these homes
will to some degree depend on the continued strength of
the California economy in general but also on the
ability to obtain financing. The smaller builder will
experience problems because they rely more on the
savings and loans for their financing than the large,
master developer. With this source of funding becoming
less and less viable, the small builder will have
difficulty surviving in a market that has the high land
prices found in Orange County.
The areas in southern California which are located close
to the ocean are unique and desireable because they are
in a metropolitan area that has an expanding total
population and rising real incomes. These conditions
create competition for the few best-quality sites
amongst those with the highest incomes as the area
grows. Since the absolute number and area of the land
remains constant, the price of this 'best' land rises
even faster than the population and incomes of the
entire area (Downs). In addition, these areas are
desireable because of the superior climate offered by
the Pacific Ocean which provides cleaner air, cooler
breezes and spectacular views unavailable inland.
Some custom builders believe that another major problem
facing this segment of the industry is constraints on
supply. For instance, in a February 1990 Los Angeles
Times interview, when Richard L. Hall, president of the
California Building Association and president of La
Linda Homes, custom building firm was asked what he
thought was the cause of a recent slowdown in housing
starts, he responded by saying that:
"there'll always be a demand for a good
custom-home builder...It's the
constraints on supply that are really
slowing things up. One of the big
problems we have in the industry is
processing time. It's not unusual to
find a project taking two to three
years to get through the government
hassles and bureaucratic red tape."
Others interviewed echoed this sentiment, complaining
that the cities often look upon developers as unlimited
sources of funds for the provision of infrastructure
improvements or "deep pockets". Most of the developers
felt that far too often, the planners and other city
officials they must work with are inexperienced and
ignorant of the realities of the financial aspects of
the development process. These problems add
considerable time and expense to the development firms
ability to receive approvals. These costs will be
passed on to the consumer in the asking price of the
house.
CHAPTER 3
METHOD OF INVESTIGATION
The thesis investigates the impacts on the homebuilding
industry of growth control plans that limit the number
of residential building permits.I am particularly
interested in how the various companies who do business
in those environments survive the lengthy and costly
regulatory process which is inherent in any growth
control system. In pursuing investigating this topic,
the fact that there are many different aspects to growth
management became evident. There is a large amount of
data regarding the impacts on growth management plans on
the cost of housing but very little information on the
direct financial impacts of these plans on the
homebuilding firms who make-up the industry. This lack
of information necessitated a compilation of existing
facts regarding the history and operating
characteristics of the homebuilding industry as well as
a review of the literature on growth management in
general. As became clear, existing literature does not
directly address the question at hand.
To gather a broad impression of current trends, I
conducted a series of interviews with people in the
homebuilding industry; those who have studied the
impacts of growth from an academic perspective; public
officials; private consultants who are hired to assist
developers with the processing and negotiations which
are inherent to growth controls; and equity investors in
housing projects (see sources). Many of my findings
were necessarily qualitative not quantitative but a good
deal of information was obtained from these interviews,
as well as from the various market studies and profiles
completed by the consulting firms interviewed.
Additional data was obtained from the general literature
documenting the impacts of growth controls on housing
prices and their impacts on the communities which
implemented such plans.
Many of the interviewees were as curious about the
impacts of these plans on the industry as this writer
yet many were prepared to take the simple way out and
respond that they didn't know the answers. When pressed
on the issue, they indicated that a single body of
knowledge on the subject not only did not exist but
would be difficult to quantify given the diversity of
business plans and record keeping undertaken by the
individual firms who make-up the homebuilding industry.
This initial frustration on my part required a
retrenchment in order to determine how to best approach
the topic.
The danger in studying any topic related to growth
management is being overwhelmed with the breadth of
information on the subject. This information includes
discussions about various state mandated plans, citizen
initiatives in communities throughout the country,
exclusionary zoning and other restrictive zoning
policies. In addition to this problem, there is the
danger of being absorbed in the growth phenomenon which
is Orange County as opposed to the growth management
plans implemented in two cities in the county and how
these plans impacts homebuilders who operate in those
communities. To avoid this problem, a strategy was
created which insured that the focus of the thesis was
not lost.
The focus of the thesis is to determine how policies
which limit the number of residential building permits
issued on an annual basis impact homebuilders. Do these
plans affect the way which homebuilders do business and
if so, how? I hypothesized that growth controls would
create a more difficult and time consuming approvals
process for homebuilders which would result in
additional costs. These costs may be so burdensome that
certain builders would not financially be able to
continue to compete in these markets or the costs in
combination with the additional expertise and energy
required to operate within such markets would dissuade
certain builders from doing business there.
Before this could be determined, it was necessary to
identify the companies that make-up the homebuilding
industry in growth control markets in Orange County,
California. To determine which communities had growth
controls as defined for this thesis, I contacted the
Southern California Association of Governments and
performed an article search of local newspapers which
had published articles on the topic. Once I discovered
that only two communities in the county had such plans,
I proceeded to identify homebuilding firms who build
there. I accomplished this by interviewing city
planning staff members in those cities and requesting
information on the plans and the most recent
allocations. In one case, this information provided me
the names of the homebuilders and characteristics about
the projects. Since this information wasn't readily
available in the other city, I requested the names of
some of the homebuilders from the planners and inquired
about that planner's professional experience with the
builder.
As it is impossible within the constraints of this
thesis to identify each and every type of company, I
chose to create two major categories or types of
companies to study: 1)companies which have held the land
for years and 2) firms which are relatively new entrants
to the market. Within these two broad categories,
subcategories were created to describe the business
choices that each of these types of companies may make
in the face of growth controls. The two major
categories seemed to be logical choices in an area of
the country which is unique in terms of the presence of
several large landholders and developers. The companies
discussed in the first category have a significant
influence over the patterns and style of development in
Orange County, and should be distinguished from those
relative newcomers in the market.
The primary sources of information for the thesis were
personal interviews conducted with employees of firms
who fit into each category. These interviews, while not
sufficient in numbers to be used as a research sample,
provided me with information about the business choices
made by companies who build homes in the Orange County
market and in those markets which have implemented
growth controls in particular. In addition, I was able
to gain an insight into how builders compete in those
markets.
The developers of housing projects in a market which has
a limitation on the number of permits issued each year
are by nature of the allocation system, in competition
with one another. This is because most plans are based
on a point system which rates each project on its impact
on local public facilities and services as well as on
the more subjective aspects of the plan relating to site
design and architectural quality.
Although in theory, one would expect that each project
would be awarded permits on the basis of the points
granted the project, this is not necessarily the case.
Because each project is reviewed by the city planning
staff and the planning board prior to receiving
approvals from the city council, there are varying
degrees of subjectivity associated with the process.
Unfortunately, there also is the exercise of arbitrary
and capricious behaviour on the part of the final
decision-making body, normally the city council. In
other words, the council in the jurisdictions
investigated for this thesis, does not have to award the
permits to the project(s) which received the highest
number of points. They are only required by ordinance
to issue the available permits to the projects which
score a minimum number of points.
In a fair system, it would seem that the projects
scoring the highest number of points would receive an
equal share of the permits available. This is not
always the case and the homebuilder who does not receive
permits may or may not deserve to feel slighted, for
each case seemed to have its own story. Based on the
interviews conducted for this thesis, there are those
homebuilders who feel that the system is in fact
arbitrary and capricious. I would also venture to note
that these same people are frustrated with the
individual professionals with whom they must deal in the
city development agencies. As one developer stated:
"The planners are young, inexperienced,
and naive about what it takes to
develop a project... They see the
developer as an open wallet".
It must be noted here that the planners have their side
of the story as well:
"Some of the developers are offended by
the process. They feel that it is
their god-given right to develop!"
Unfortunately, there is some justification for both
opinions. There are many inexperienced planners hired
by the cities who don't have experience in the
development of projects. These planners are technicians
carrying out a mandate from the city council. Innate
knowledge about the financial realities of homebuilding
would probably not influence the decisions they make in
reviewing development projects. On the other hand,
there are those developers who fail to appreciate that
they must learn to interact positively with the city
representatives and the process in general if they hope
to be successful.
Besides the allocation awards, the homebuilders operate
in a competitive marketplace where prices are determined
by the demand for the product. This is particularly
true in southern California and Orange County in
particular. Until recently, there has been little
competition amongst homebuilders in this area because of
the enormous demand for homes. This situation is now
changing as a result of an approximate twenty percent
increase in the cost of housing over each of the last
three years. This price rise in combination with
increasing land costs due to the lack of available land,
have resulted in a slowdown in the market due to the
homebuyer's inability to obtain financing. The median
priced single family home in Orange County, California
as of April 1990 is estimated to cost $335,000 (The
Meyers Group). Such a high median price makes it very
difficult for first-time buyers to enter the market. As
a result, densities have increased in the county as
developers have begun to offer attached units to
first-time buyers as an affordable alternative to
detached units.
Increased sale prices have also caused the average size
of homes to increase as it is now economically necessary
to produce single-family detached units with higher
densities. Single-family detached lots typically range
from 4,500 to 8,000 square feet with most lots held by
the largest or production builders ranging from 4,000 to
6,000 square feet with an average of 6,500 square feet
(ULI,1990). Constructing larger, more expensive units
on smaller lots provides the homebuilder with more
profit per lot and higher profit margins. When only a
limited number of units can be built, as in communities
with growth controls, the units are often designed to
include expensive amenities and features which maximize
the builders' net income. This factor raises the
average price and quality of units over time, shifting
the mix toward larger and more luxurious units.
Builders do not construct moderate-priced homes in
markets with very strong demand or where there are
severe governmental restrictions on how many units each
builder can build each year (Salomon Brothers).
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CHAPTER 4
INDUSTRY RESPONSES TO GROWTH
CONTROLS
There are various business responses to growth controls
taken by the homebuilding firms who operate in
communities which have implemented limitations on the
number of residential building permits which shall be
issued on an annual basis. They include entering into
joint ventures with equity partners, becoming more
sophisticated in the development process and becoming
land developers as opposed to just homebuilders.
Joint-Ventures and Land Developers
The ability to finance all real estate projects has
become more difficult in response to a slowdown in the
economy and the imposition of lending restrictions on
the savings and loan industry. Homebuilding companies
of all sizes have had to seek out new sources of equity
financing for their projects. The primary sources of
this equity are foreign investors, pension funds and
insurance companies but also include large corporations
such as General Electric and Weyerhauser. These groups
have large amounts of capital to invest and are looking
for long-term appreciation and participation in projects
with strong local developers.
There are a number of large homebuilding firms who are
themselves joint venturing. According to Richard Hall
of the BIA:
"The big builders, the master
developers, a lot of them are joint
venturing too. They'll buy thousands
of acres of land at a time and invite
other builders to come in and build"
Hall believes that while sources of capital may be
shrinking, eventually leading to less competition in the
building industry, this joint venturing by the master
developers,
"means there are more people
participating in the industry. It
enables a lot of the smaller builders
to take advantage of the expertise of
the master developer in things like
marketing".
Many small and medium sized homebuilding firms who do
not have large land holdings need alternative sources of
financing in order to enter growth control communities.
As these firms enter the market, they are faced with
high land costs and high sales costs which will make the
sale of their product more difficult (ULI). In order to
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purchase and develop land in a highly regulated market,
they must take on a financial partner who is willing to
and capable of sustaining the lengthy development
process. This represents a substantial risk for any
investor/partner which must be mitigated by the
developer's ability to maximize the possibility of
obtaining building permits and producing a saleable
unit.
Joint venture partners can provide the needed capital
for the acquisition of the land and the funding of any
necessary off-site improvements. For example, a 1,000
acre project consisting of 2,200 total units in the City
of San Clemente, California is being constructed by a
joint venture between Centex Homes and Westinghouse
Credit Corporation. Centex was successful in
negotiating a favorable development agreement with the
city after a nine month period in which all due
diligence was completed. While the development
agreement does not guarantee permits, it does provide
Centex with some assurance that their project will be
able to proceed and will receive certain improvements to
be provided by the city so long as permits are
available. As an equity investor, Westinghouse Credit
provided $50 million for acquisition of the land and $36
million in required off-site improvements. Centex Homes
has built in other California communities which have
growth controls with far less success. They indicated
that they would not have entered the San Clemente market
which has a growth control plan had it not been able to
obtain Westinghouse Credit as a partner, since the
up-front costs and the resultant carrying costs would
have been prohibitive.
Westinghouse entered into this arrangement because of
the success of past deals they had successfully
completed with Centex. They looked upon Centex as an
experienced builder who has been in business in various
markets across the count-y since the 1950s. In
addition, they expect to receive a return on their
investment in the range of twenty to thirty percent over
a twenty year build-out.
In order to attract a joint venture partner, the
developer must complete considerable amounts of
information and planning. This planning includes the
dimensions of the project, and a complete set of
financial statements including the economic benefits to
be expected. Without detailed information of this type,
joint venture partners cannot know whether they ought to
become involved in the deal. Once this information is
provided, the developer will understand that the
potential returns to the partner must be more than the
returns that the developer could expect if there were no
partnership. Without these higher returns, there would
be no incentive for the partner to participate.
By contrast, large development companies which have
been landowners for some time are not as reliant on
these new sources of financing since they purchased the
land for a price which resulted in a very low basis in
the property. Thus, the overall escalation in the cost
of land in the surrounding area has made their property
that much more valuable. This valuable land in
combination with a proven track record in the
development industry has placed these companies in a
very favorable position. Lots on properties owned by
these large builders are presently valued from $80,000
to $100,000 per lot. If these companies continue to
develop the properties themselves, they will experience
substantial profits by building new single-family
detached houses and townhouses which continue to be in
demand (ULI). Some of these companies can also choose
to sell the properties to merchant builders who must
build to the standards of the large or master developer
and must share the profits of their sales with these
sellers.
The Legal Entitlement Process
Although these larger companies are presently
well-positioned economically, they have no guarantees
that they will receive building permits in communities
which have implemented growth controls. And if they are
unable to receive enough building permits and complete
sales to make payments on land acquistion loans taken
out for the property, they will face financial problems
in the future. These companies must therefore be
proficient in the legal entitilement or approval process
in order to maximize their chances of receiving permits.
This process involves the review of site and
architectural plans, engineering plans and negotiations
regarding public facilities and services to be provided
by the developer.
As mentioned above, Westinghouse Credit agreed to enter
into the financial arrangement with Centex because they
were confident that Centex could successfully negotiate
all of the necessary development approvals. Regardless
of the size of the company, the successful firms in this
process either have staff members assigned the
responsibility of gaining city approvals or hire an
outside consultant to perform this task. Both a
thorough understanding of the residential allocation
plan and the basis for its implementation will provide
the firm with valuable insight into the city's goals for
the residential allocation program. It is also
necessary for firms to develop a rapport with those
individuals within the city who are involved in the
development process in order to be sure that the project
being proposed is consistent with the development
pattern and overall design goals and objectives of the
city.
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Chapter 5
AN EVALUATION OF INDUSTRY
OPERATIONS IN GROWTH CONTROLLED
COMMUNITIES
Up to this point this thesis has reviewed the literature
written on the history of growth management and the
growth control movement in California. It has also
discussed the nature of the homebuilding industry and
has identified some of the major types of homebuilding
firms who operate in communities which have implemented
growth control plans in Orange County, California.
Finally it has described the strategies which these
firms may utilize in an effort to survive the lengthy
and critical approvals process associated with growth
control plans.
A review of the various data gathered for this project,
reveals a number of unique characteristics and trends
regarding the economics of the homebuilding industry in
Orange County, California. Demand for housing units
in Orange County is great as the state continues to
experience economic growth. The consumer is however
finding it increasingly difficult to afford a home. The
combination of high land costs and controls on the
number of permits available for construction contribute
to the development of larger homes on smaller lots.
This repositioning addresses the developer's need for
larger profit margins in order to be successful. Rising
land prices are a key element behind higher home prices
in high-priced regions of the country such as Orange
County. These higher land prices are the result of
supply-side forces in an area which is economically
prosperous. When an area prospers because of rising
employment, population and income, stronger demand
boosts housing prices. In order to staff its booming
economy however, an area must be able to attract more
people. This can only be done if there is an adequate
supply of housing which these employees can afford to
purchase (Downs).
In response to the rapid growth in Orange County, some
of its communities have enacted policies restricting the
amount of growth that can occur in a given timeframe.
This thesis has looked specifically at communities which
have limited the number of residential building permits
available on an annual basis. These restrictions are
designed to limit the impact on the services which the
community must provide its residents and to maintain the
quality of life and character which contributed to its
desireabity. The maintenance of existing services is
important to the continuing prosperity of the community.
Perhaps ironically, these policies which restrict supply
in the face of demand, force housing prices to ever
higher levels making it difficult for not only newcomers
to purchase homes but many long-time residents (e.g.
those who grew up there) as well.
The homebuilding industry is forced to offer an
expensively priced unit as a result of the high costs of
land, construction, government fees and financing.
These units may be either single family detached or
attached units: the latter is relatively more affordable
to the consumer and represents an increasing (43% as of
April 1990) segment of the Orange County housing market.
Government fees and permits are estimated to have
increased 384% over the eight year period from 1981 to
1989. Land costs are estimated to have increased by 61%
over the same period causing an increase in taxes of
3,672% These astronomical cost increases are major
factors facing both the homebuilding industry and the
consumer. It is estimated that these fees and permits
add as much as $20,000 to the cost of a new 1,600 square
foot home (Sunstrom, 1989).
Land price is established by first determining what
buyers are willing to pay for finished homes (based on a
number of factors including location, proximity to
amenities, taxes, and design features) and then
subtracting development and improvement costs and
builder profit from the eventual selling price of the
final product. The remaining value (or land residual)
represents the price the builder is willing to pay based
on the economic potential of the land. Exhibit 2 is
based on recent pro formas used by some major home
builders in Orange County and is included as an example
of residual land costs in the county. These land costs
alone contribute to the need for financial support at
levels never before experienced. Government fees are
based on the costs that cities attach to the
construction and/or improvement of infrastructure and
facilities and are often established as a factor of the
community's desire to encourage development. They are
often cited by the industry as another contributing
factor to their inability to provide housing at
affordable levels.
It is apparent that it is more difficult in general for
real estate development firms to receive financing for
their projects as the savings and loan crisis has forced
the imposition of limitations on the amount of money
that can be loaned to real estate ventures. This has
severely reduced the primary source of funding,
contributed to both an increase in interest rates and in
the slowdown of real estate development across the
country. Homebuilding firms are particularly impacted
by these limitations because higher interest rates and
housing prices have resulted in slower sales of units.
These factors when added to a difficult development
approvals process have made the homebuilding industry a
more complicated and risky development environment.
Without exception, the homebuilding firms who were able
and fortunate enough to purchase large tracts of land in
the past and who were able to afford to develop the land
over time as opposed to selling it, are the most
successful. These firms have the advantage of a
relatively low cost basis in the property coupled with
the experience of building homes in the southern
California marketplace. The larger homebuilding firms
will continue to be able to raise capital through credit
lines, commercial paper, and securities offerings
(Eichler). The larger homebuilders who have developed a
strong track record in the development industry over the
years are not as severely impacted by the recent
tightening of the capital markets and are able to
continue to build as permits become available. This is
primarily due to relationships that they have developed
with the lending community over the years but is also
the result of the development of a proven product which
is acceptable to the lenders, the community and the
buying public. This competitive advantage has not been
a guarantee of success for inefficiently run companies
in growth control communities, however. As mentioned
earlier in the thesis, only those large firms which
understand the importance of the development approvals
process and which work closely with those who are
responsible for administering the plans are successful
in these markets. These same companies must also be
successful in the marketing of their product.
There are, of course, exceptions to this in that some
communities look upon the homebuilder as an "easy
mark" from whom any number of exactions can be demanded.
The cause of such behavior is difficult to ascertain.
It may be driven by an anti-growth attitude that is
pervasive throughout the city and that is directed
towards all members of the development community, or it
may be the result of an acrimonious relationship between
employees of the city and the developer of any given
project. In any event, arbitrary behavior can be
expensive for both the developer and the city as it
causes delays while the parties argue the merits of
the exactions. These disagreements have also led to
litigation which is expensive to all parties involved.
Some of the larger firms have an established presence in
the marketplace that allows them to be able to maintain
a significant influence over even local decision-makers.
This influence is the result of the combination of the
fact that the companies own large amounts of land, have
constructed large amounts of product in the area and
have involved themselves in the political fabric of the
communities in which they operate. But of most
significance is the success of the product which the
company builds. If a company has successfully built and
sold products which have been consistently attractive to
the marketplace, a company has created a competitive
advantage for itself. This competitive advantage makes
it difficult for other firms to break into the market,
for they are not as well positioned financially nor can
they perform to the standards that are often created by
the larger, established firms. There is no substitute
for marketing prowess in a market where lengthy
development approvals can take as long as four years. A
homebuilder must be able to anticipate what product is
most likely to be saleable by the time the project
receives approvals and is actually constructed. This is
an especially risky aspect of the development business.
Several of the homebuilders interviewed for this thesis
admitted that they probably should conduct additional
economic analysis, but so far have not been forced to
due to the high demand for housing in the county. As
competition for scarce land increases, driving home
prices even higher, homebuilders and major employers in
the county will find it necessary to understand those
economic forces which will impact the region's economy
as a whole, particularly its ability to house its
workers.
In general, the homebuilding industry responds to growth
controls by becoming better capitalized, which provides
the financial flexibility and staying power necessary in
a lengthy development process. Since a company that
owns the land will at best receive only a limited number
of building permits each year, such companies must be
able to financially withstand this extended development
schedule. The small and middle-sized builders who in
the past were able to raise money to buy land, install
improvements, and build houses are no longer able to
sustain this lengthy process in view of the limitation
on the amount of capital available for construction
loans from the savings and loans. They must therefore
seek new sources of capital through joint ventures with
either large homebuilders or other sources of capital
such as off-shore investors, pension funds or insurance
companies. In addition to the need to obtain new
sources of income, the companies must learn to be
successful in the development approvals process which
has been described throughout this thesis, as time
consuming and costly.
CHAPTER 6
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND
CONCLUSIONS
As California continues to experience the economic and
population growth of the last decade, it will also
experience some degradation in its quality of life.
Such things as traffic congestion, air pollution and
shortages of water and sewer capacities will contribute
to a clamoring for some form of growth management or
controls. Because the homebuilding industry plays a
significant role in the growth of any community and is
directly affected by growth controls, it will have to be
a major participant in future development plans.
Richard Hall of the BIA claims:
"we're going to be building coalitions
between environmentalists, slow-growth
people, builders--we're all going to
have to work together. We're going to
have to realize we all have the same
concerns. It may not always appear
that way because of the antagonism
created by both sides".
Without this sort of coalition building, the
homebuilding industry will continue to have a poor image
amongst many Californians.
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This thesis has investigated the impacts of growth
management plans on the homebuilding industry. It has
shown that in an increasingly regulated marketplace with
limited sources of financing, the larger homebuilder who
has banked the land is in the most advantageous
position. But due to sharp increases in the costs
associated with development, even large homebuilders are
forced to seek out financial partners. They also may
choose to become land developers who sell the land to
merchant builders at a profit rather than developing it
themselves. These "master developers" provide a
business environment for smaller builders who otherwise
would be excluded from the market. While these large
and medium-sized builders are able to remain active in a
market with extremely high land costs, smaller builders
will have a difficult time surviving. The only
exception to this would seem to be the small builder of
expensive, custom homes. The thesis has also described
the factors which make building difficult in communities
which have implemented growth controls.
Even when homebuilders undertake the operational
approaches described in the previous chapters of this
thesis in their business, they will find it difficult to
produce an affordable house that is within the grasp of
most of the residents of Orange County. In a more
typical economic environment where land costs are not as
high as in Orange County, there is a broader price range
of housing units available. This is becoming more and
more difficult to achieve in California. Although no
figures were available for Orange County specifically,
it is estimated that only 17% of the families in Los
Angeles, San Francisco and San Diego qualify for the
median-priced home vs. about 45% who qualify on a
national level (Barrons 1990). This leaves 83% of the
families in a situation where home ownership may never
be realized. The reality of this situation is that
fewer communities are able to provide housing that is
affordable to a wide range of people.
Affordability is obviously an even greater problem for
those at the lowest end of the economic spectrum for
fewer rental units and low-cost housing units will be
constructed as builders escalate their prices and build
more expensive units due to "excess demand". This is
particularly true when local governments limit the
number of housing units (Downs).
The facts described here- and in legions of other
writings indicate that growth controls are a
contributing factor to the escalation of housing prices.
This is particularly true in the highest-priced areas of
the country where a high level of amenities and strong
economic growth contribute to an influx of population.
When an area is experiencing growth pressures as a
result of economic growth across the metropolitan area
as opposed to growth stimulated by strictly amenities
(e.g. Hawaii), it will find it difficult to limit
actual population growth. Governments must therefore
consider reducing barriers to expanding the supply of
available housing faster and permitting lower-cost
housing to be built in more locations. These policies
include zoning more land for multi-family housing,
reducing minimum lot size and minimum housing-unit size
requirements, speeding up processes for approving
proposed residential subdivisions, and paying for more
infrastructures through general government spending,
rather than by imposing those costs on the new units
served (Downs).
These suggestions are reasonable to a point, for there
must be an effort mounted by local governments to ensure
that affordable housing be made available for all of its
residents. There is some irony to this situation
however, because the many relatively wealthy... suburban
communities also used their zoning laws to keep out
unwanted minorities and the poor. Whether for racial or
for economic motives--often for both--restrictive zoning
served to harm the excluded and to raise the prices they
paid for the leftover housing they were able to obtain
(Popper, 1981). The relaxation of these policies would
be contrary to the community's desire to control growth.
Even if there is no conscious desire on the part of the
community to exclude certain groups of people, the
imposition of supply-side factors such as growth
controls makes it difficult for people of a wide range
of income levels to afford to live in these communities.
In assessing high home prices states that "localities
that seek to slow down growth--namely high-priced areas
that are experiencing economic booms--usually reduce
permissible housing densities, increase minimum lot-size
and house-size requirements, place annual limits on the
number of units that can be built, slow the permission
process, and require developers to pay for their own
infrastructure plus huge "impact fees" (Downs). I would
agree "that all of these policies boost housing costs
even higher".
In order to make housing more affordable, communities
must work closely with the development community to
create living environments that are designed to be more
efficient, more dense and that are closer to employment
nodes. This will not be an easy task in a suburban area
where people still very much desire the single family
detached home surrounded by private open space. The
typical consumer in these areas of the country has not
shown a desire for high density living although the
attached housing unit is becoming more acceptable due to
its affordability. The density of projects of these
projects rarely exceed a density of more than 20 units
to the acre. Homebuilders will need to encourage the
design of more medium density projects which can provide
many of the amenities of single family living while not
taxing the infrastructure and services of the community.
They must work closely with government agencies and
local community groups to devise land use policies which
will both protect the quality of life and allow for
affordable housing.
City governments must devise and utilize alternative
methods of funding improvements in an effort to remove
some of the cost burden of infrastructure improvements
required of the developer. These methods include the
use of bond financing to equitably pay for the cost of
new services. The issue of equity is important in this
discussion because the fees that the homebuilder and
ultimately the new homeowner pay to construct and
purchase a home provides both the new and the exisiting
homeowners with new services and facilities such as
roads, fire stations and schools that the new homeowners
did not have to pay for. An example of a bond financing
program which serves as an effective means of equitable
taxation for services is the Mello-Roos Community
Facilities District Act which was passed by the
California state Legislature in 1982. The Act
establishes a method for cities, counties, special
districts, school districts and other municipal
corporations to form a seperate district to finance
public facilities through the selling of bonds
(Sundstrom). The taxing authority in a Mello-Roos
District can only levy a tax against the benefited
property. With a general obligation bond, the taxing
authority can levy against all taxpayers in the district
(Sundstrom). This funding mechanism requires project
coordination between government agencies and the
developer or homebuilder and is an example of the
cooperation that is necessary to improve the impacts of
rapid development including the provision of affordable
housing.
In addition to funding alternatives, cities must
encourage projects that are more efficiently designed
from a land-use perspective. This can be accomplished
by zoning property to minimize the need for expensive
infrastructure extensions such as roads and water and
sewer lines and by creating zoning districts which allow
higher density projects. This is not an easy task, for
the land that remains available for development is land
on the edges of the urban or metropolitan area.
Ideally, cities could encourage the development of
multi-use developments or urban villages where work and
living environments overlap, but the demand for such
projects has so far not been great. These types of
projects may not be the entire solution, however; in
sprawling suburban areas, they would result in the
development of additional nodes which have certainly
contributed to traffic congestion. Also, there are
communities who would discourage these projects because
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of their higher densities and the stigma attached to
these densities. Still, compromises must be made.
A reconsideration of the development review or approvals
process is another opportunity for local governments to
improve the services they provide the development
community. The goal should be to make the system as
efficient as possible without it being economically
burdensome to the developer. This will require the
establishment of a more professional work force who is
able to work with the homebuilder to devise the best
project for the community. Unfortunately, city
government does not provide enough incentive for quality
employees to continue employment long enough to
establish credibility and consistency. Beyond personnel
and procedural issues, cities must review the
development fees which they have used as a special
exaction levied on home builders and developers tied to
new development of residential and commercial
properties. These fees have become a popular way to
fund everything from new roadways to fire stations. As
mentioned earlier in the thesis, these fees have
increased astronomically over the years.
As the various government entities in Orange County have
come to realize, many of the problems caused by rapid
population growth must be handled on a regional basis,
for eliminating the problem in one community will more
than likely only push it to a neighboring community.
The county has established a growth management task
force which will devise county-wide regulations
regarding the conditions under which a developer may
build as related to existing levels of service in the
area of the proposed project. Efforts of this sort will
be necessary to address the housing affordability issue
in the county but short of additional federal government
subsidies that would write-down the price of land or a
long-term downturn in the economy which does not seem
likely, housing prices will continue to rise.
The homebuilding industry will continue to thrive in
these environments as demand for housing continues. The
advantage that California has over other housing markets
which have suffered serious declines over recent years,
is the fact that its housing market is not overbuilt, it
is simply overpriced. While there are various factors
which contribute to these high prices, those who have
been described here as having access to the land will be
fortunate enough to continue to build, even in growth
control communities. The majority of these companies
will adapt to growth controls simply because they will
not be able to afford not to build on what is very
valuable land.
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EXHIBIT 1
Forest
Pacific Ocean
Balboa
North County
Hills
Mission Viejo
Lacuna Beach
Dana Point
EXHIBIT 2
SINGLE FAMILY DETACHED
LAND RESIDUAL ANALYSIS
BASIC PROJECT RSSUMPTIONS
DUELLING UNITS:
GROSS ACRES:
NET ACRES:
DENSITY:
RUG. SELLING PRICE:
AUG. SQUARE FOOTAGE:
VALUE RATIO:
COST PER SQUARE FOOT:
REVENUES
Sales price
Lot PreMium
Total
BUILDER DEVELOPMENT COSTS
Direct construction
Indirect construction
Finance
Marketing
Overhead
Warrantyg
Transportation Corridor fee
School and other governMental fees
Other
PER UNIT
300,000
300,000
90,000
9,000
27,000
15,000
9,000
2,250
1,500
9,000
162,750
TOTrAL
36,000,000
36,000,000
10,800,000
1,080,000
3,240,000
1,800,000
1,080,000
270,000
180,000
1,080,000
19,530,000
BUILDER IMPROVEMENT COSTS
Lot improvements
Rec comwon area
Builder profit
TOTAL BUILDER COSTS
LAND RESIDUAL
PER GROSS ACRE
PER NET ACRE
222,750
77,250
nmmmmmmm
26,730,000 74.25P
9,270,000 25.75%
m mmmmmmmm mm mmmmm mm
403,043
618,000
120
23.00
15.00
8.00
300,000
2,000
150.00
45.00
100.00
100.002
30.002
3.00%
9.002
S.00
3.00%
0.75
0.SO%
3.00%
54.25%
25,000
5,000
30,000
3,000,000
600,000
3,600,000
3,600,00030,000
8.332
1.6T2
10.00P
10.00%
